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I: Introduction
Following Tunisia, Egypt was the second Arab nation to engage in the Arab
Spring, as massive civil uprisings in protest of its former repressive dictator Hosni
Mubarak succeeded in toppling his regime after thirty years of rule. While this
revolution had set and achieved its primary goal – to overthrow Mubarak – it did not,
however, include a plan for the restructuring of the Egyptian political system after the fall
of its leader in February of 2011. Consequently, the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces (SCAF), the leaders of the Egyptian military, assumed power following
Mubarak’s exit, promising to “maintain the homeland”1 in the process of preparing to
hold free elections in the near future. The SCAF ‘maintained the homeland’ for 17
months after the fall of their former leader, until elections were finally held in June of
2012. On June 24th, Mohamed Morsi, a member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, was
declared the fifth president of Egypt.
Morsi is Egypt’s first civilian president. Ever since the Free Officers Revolution
of 1952, Egypt has been ruled by a succession of military leaders, including Gamal Abdel
Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. Consequently, political and economic
authority has since rested in the hands of the military. In order to establish and maintain a
functional and representational democracy in this period of post-revolution transition, this
hierarchy of power must be reversed: civilian leadership must be able to control the
intentions and actions of the military. This change is significant and will be difficult to

1

“Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces: Statements and Key Leaders,” New York Times, 14
February 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/10/world/middleeast/20110210-egyptsupreme-council.html.
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accomplish given the degree to which the military has enjoyed its dominant role in
Egyptian society over the past sixty years.
The underlying challenge at the heart of the civil-military question is how to
“reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a
military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.”2 This is a
rather interesting paradox: “because we fear others we create an institution of violence to
protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection.”3 What is most
perplexing of all, I believe, is that no one knows the right answer to the question. As the
newly elected civilian president of Egypt, Morsi must navigate his way and prove his
legitimacy in a society where the line between too much military authority and too little
military authority is ambiguous. If Morsi goes too far in suppressing military authority in
the coming months, he runs the risk of catalyzing a military coup against his government.
On the other hand, if he gives the armed forces too much leeway, the military has the
capacity to undermine his civilian leadership, and make him more of a symbolic
figurehead than an actual source of governing power.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to evaluate the strategic approaches
undertaken by Egypt’s former leaders in an overall attempt to provide a comprehensive
answer to this central question: what are President Morsi’s strategies for controlling the
military in post-revolutionary Egypt? I will argue that, while Morsi has demonstrated his
desire to control the armed forces through various institutional changes, his efforts have
fallen short of attacking the heart of the problem, which is the deeply-rooted militaristic

2

Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian
Control”, Armed Forces and Society, 23 (1996):149.
3
Ibid, 150.
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culture that has come to be valued and accepted by Egyptian society throughout the
course of the last sixty years.
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II. Civil-Military Theory
In the following section, I provide an analysis of civil-military theory from a
variety of standpoints, both historical and contemporary. The purpose of this section is to
offer a basic understanding of the ways in which civilian and military institutions are
inclined to balance power in society.
Huntington & Janowitz
Civil-military relations refers to the relationship between civil and military
authority in a given society. The study of civil-military relations is extensive, as it
pertains to a variety of subject matters and academic areas, including political science,
philosophy, sociology, anthropology, law, and the like. Samuel Huntington and Morris
Janowitz serve as the founders of the contemporary study of civil-military relations in the
age of liberal democracy, bringing with them the generally accepted normative belief that
civilian authority is preferable to military control of the state. In order to maintain the
liberal values intrinsic to democracy, the civilian authority must be able to control its
military. But how can this be done?
Huntington, “arguably the greatest American political scientist of our time,”4
introduced his theory of civil-military relations in his book The Soldier and the State. He
sees civilian control as a function of either “objective control” or “subjective control”.5
Objective control is the process by which the military maximizes its professionalism,
removing it from any sort of political involvement. More specifically, it is the
“distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most
4

Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, (New York: The
Free Press, 2002), 4.
5
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1981), 83.
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conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of
the officer corps.”6 It isolates the military from politics, renders it politically neutral, but
gives it “as free a hand as possible in military matters.”7 Subjective control is, instead,
the maximization of civilian power in relation to the military – a process that is
complicated by “the large number, varied character, and conflicting interests” of civilian
groups within a society.8 Objective control, therefore, is the healthier and more effective9
approach to civilian control of the military organization in any given state, according to
Eliot Cohen. It is often referred to as a liberal theory primarily concerned that the
structure of civil-military relations is such that it enables the military to “protect
democratic values by defeating external threats.”10
Conversely, Morris Janowitz proposes what is commonly referred to as a civicrepublic theory of democratic civil-military relations, which is concerned more that civilmilitary relations are able to sustain democratic values – “especially the value of civic
virtue – by bolstering civic participation through the citizen-soldier’s role.”11 In other
words, civilian control comes from greater civic participation by both soldiers and
civilians alongside one another. While Janowitz’ theory is also concerned with
professionalism as is Huntington’s, he sees the military’s politicization as somewhat
unavoidable.12

6

Ibid, 83.
Cohen, 4.
8
Huntington, 80.
9
Cohen, 4.
10
James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society, 29 (2002):
12.
11
Ibid, 12.
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Ibid, 12.
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Contemporary Theories of Civil-Military Relations
Both of these theories, while they have served as a general basis for subsequent
civil-military theory, are somewhat outdated. They were conceived in the historical
context of the Cold War when the Soviet threat required the U.S. military to maintain a
large standing army for the first time, which was controversial because no one knew if its
permanence within the state would threaten civilian authority, and therefore undermine
America’s ability to sustain a liberal democracy.13 Many of the theories that have
emerged since are concerned primarily with newly formed democracies, often
highlighting the changes in civil-military relations that occur when a state transitions
from authoritarianism to democracy. These are the theories that are the most relevant to
this paper’s discussion of Egyptian civil-military relations.
Deborah Norden, for instance, uses Huntington’s theory as a springboard in her
discussion of civil-military relations in Latin America. She argues that the case of
Venezuela discredits the necessity for complete civilian oversight of the armed forces,
and that it was actually the “government’s ability to fit the armed forces into its broader
policy goals” that allowed “for relatively more political authority over the military than
[what] might [have been] expected.”14 The way she rationalizes her theory is by breaking
down the three elements of control: domination, who commands the armed force;
management, who directs the armed forces; and authority, what militaries believe.15 A
government need not possess all three dimensions of control; the more facets achieved,

13

Feaver, 159.
Deborah Norden, “Civilian Authority without Civilian Dominance? Assessing Venezuelan PoliticalMilitary Relations under Chavez,” 2007, 1.
15
Ibid, 1-2.
14
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however, the more control the civilian authority has over the military.16 In the
Venezuelan case, therefore, civilian control stemmed from a shared political ideology.
Rebecca Schiff offers an alternative model, the theory of concordance, which
interprets effective civil-military relations as a function of coordinated institutional
efforts. Schiff proposes that this cooperation should occur between “three partners – the
military, the political elites, and the citizenry” in determining “the social composition of
the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military
style.”17 She argues that the main issue with the current theory of civil-military relations
is that it requires militaries to remain “physically and ideologically separated from
political institutions.”18 This theory of separation derives from the American civilmilitary experience, which “assumes that American institutional separation should be
applied to all nations to prevent domestic military intervention.”19 The American case,
however, is in many ways specific to its historical and cultural legacies, which renders it
inadequate as a standard basis of civil-military theory for other nations.20 The
concordance theory does not base its rationale on the American case; instead, it
“considers the unique historical and cultural experiences of nations and the various other
possibilities for civil-military relations.”21
The theories of both Norden and Schiff prove that developing societies involve a
wide range of complex variables that affect civil-military relations. Consequently, the
challenge of controlling the armed forces differs depending on these variables. A state’s
16

Ibid, 3.
Rebecca Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” Armed Forces &
Society, 22 (1995): 7.
18
Ibid, 7.
19
Ibid, 8.
20
Ibid, 8.
21
Ibid, 8.
17
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national ethos, the military’s sense of purpose and role, the prevalence of stable or
unstable institutions within the state, the type of government in place, and the state’s
historical legacy are all among the elements that influence the balance between civilian
and military authority within a developing nation.
In his subsequent piece Reforming Civil-Military Relations, Huntington provides
a discussion pertaining to the question of civil-military relations in developing countries.
He argues that new democracies – especially those emerging from authoritarian regimes
– face four primary challenges: 1) the definition of the military’s specific roles; 2)
military political intervention; 3) “pre-existing military privileges”; 4) and “the
development and diffusion of new military technology.”22 While all four of these
challenges apply to the Egyptian case, the first three are particularly central to this paper.
Important Themes
For the purposes of this paper, several themes will be important to the discussion
of civil-military relations in Egypt. First of all, professionalism will be mentioned quite
frequently throughout my analysis. According to Roderic Camp, professionalism has five
distinct characteristics:
(1)it must be based upon a body of systematic theory
(for example, theories of warfare); (2) its members
must possess differentiating expertise (for example,
knowledge of military strategy and weaponry); (3)
it must incorporate certain powers and privileges
granted by society (for example, the military exercises
autonomous control over its admission, training,
and standards); (4) it must subscribe to a code of
ethics (the most critical variable for the military
because a code governs intra- and inter-group
relationships); and (5) its culture, including values,
norms, and symbols, must convey its mystique and

22

Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” Journal of Democracy, 6 (1995): 14.
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distinctions.23

More generally, a professional military is one that is aware of its specific roles, is welltrained and organized, and functions with the same degree of expertise as any other
professional within society, whether that be a doctor, banker, or academic professor.
Secondly, military disengagement – or rather, de-politicization – is another key
theme for this paper. A military is depoliticized when it abstains from playing a direct
political role in the government. It can be defined as “the substitution of praetorian
policies and personnel with these advocated by the recognized civilian authorities,” and
occurs when the armed forces “return to the barracks and make room for some kind of
civilian rule.”24 This means, for instance, that governmental ministries and cabinets are
filled by civilians rather than military officers.
Conversely, the politicization of the armed forces enables military officers to
participate directly in governmental affairs. According to normative standards of
democratic civil-military theory, allowing the politicization of the military is dangerous
because it enables the armed forces to act as another interest group within society. In
order to secure its interests, a politicized military may opt to use force in the place of
diplomatic decision-making processes. As you will see, Egyptian leaders either attempted
to politicize or depoliticize the military in their efforts to control it.
Cooptation is also significant to this paper, especially in its application to the
military institution during the Mubarak era. The civilian authority typically coopts a
military by ‘winning it over’, which can be done through the provision of certain valuable
23

Roderic Camp, “Citizen and Military Views of Civil-Military Relations”, In Generals in Modern Mexico,
2004: 2-3.
24
Constantine Danopoulos, From Military to Civilian Rule, London: Routledge, 1992: 1.
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incentives. Incentives can be monetary, in which a form of financial security is given to
military personnel in exchange for their commitment to the civilian authority. They can
also be political, in which military officers are promised prominent positions within the
government in return for their political loyalty to civilian rule. In essence, it is a form of
mutual accommodation that provides privileges in exchange for political obedience.
Finally, civilian control is yet another central topic. It can be defined as the set of
institutions and mechanisms – i.e., control over the budget, policy, and endowments –
that are used to make sure that the civilian government remains fully in control of the
instruments that have the ability to influence military power. In a democratic setting, it
often involves the establishment of a constitution that creates a framework in which the
tasks of legislative, executive, and judicial powers are designated to civilian control.25
Further, military transparency is an important mechanism of democratic civilian control,
as it pertains to “the military’s openness and its accountability toward civil society.”26

25

Marian Zulean, “Western Assistance in Democratization of Civil-Military Relations in Southeastern
Europe,” Sphere of Politics, 107 (2004): 22.
26
Ibid, 23.
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III: The Officers’ Republic
Between the Free Officers Revolution of 1952 and the toppling of Hosni Mubarak
in February of 2011, Egypt was ruled by four presidents, all originating from the military:
Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar al-Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak.27
Throughout this period of nearly sixty years, the “military has dominated the country’s
politics”, prompting the “long-standing subordination of civilian leadership to the
influence of the military establishment.”28 This has led to the emergence of what Yezid
Sayigh refers to as the “officers’ republic”, or the “self-perpetuating military networks
that permeate virtually all branches and levels of state administration and of the stateowned sectors of the economy.”29 The officers’ republic not only exercises control of the
defense budget, U.S. military assistance, and much of the Egyptian economy, it also
enjoys “a deep sense of institutional and personal entitlement”30 – an elevated social
status that unquestionably stems from this legacy of military dominance.
The centralization of power in the executive branch of the republic, not
coincidentally “the strongest branch within”31 the Egyptian political system, is a
fundamental characteristic of the political apparatus that enables the persistence of the
officers’ republic. Despite, for instance, the existence of an independent judiciary branch,
the degree of power invested in the executive is such that it negates the functionality of
proper checks and balances. The Administrative Monitoring Agency, one of several
oversight agencies in Egypt, serves as a pertinent example of this lopsided political
27

Laurel E. Miller et al., “Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the
Globe,” Rand National Defense Research Institute (2012): 82.
28
Ibid, 82.
29
Yezid Sayigh, “Above the State: The Officers’ Republic in Egypt”, The Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (2012): 3.
30
Ibid, 3.
31
Miller et al., 82.
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system. It was established in 1958 “to investigate administrative and financial violations”
with a mandate “to combat corruption throughout the country and in the entire state
apparatus.”32 The only component of the state over which the Administrative Monitoring
Agency cannot exert its jurisdiction is the armed forces, because the military is not
subject to “any civilian oversight beyond that of the president, who until Morsi’s election
had always been an ex-military man.”33 This exemplifies an instance of reciprocity, in
which the regime looks out for the corporate interests of the military in exchange for
unfaltering military loyalty and support for the regime. The notion of reciprocity is one
that extends throughout the entirety of the Egyptian republic, supporting the argument
that “the military remains central to Egyptian politics because it provides the power base
for the president and protection for the regime.”34 This reciprocal relationship is a threat
to the future of Egyptian democracy, in that it allows the military to become a prominent
political actor in the democratic state.
International factors have also contributed significantly to the entrenchment of the
officers’ republic within Egyptian society. The military disaster of the 1967 Six-Day War
with Israel prompted Nasser to initiate policies that would improve the effectiveness of
the Egyptian Armed Forces as a military entity of force and national security. Further,
Egypt’s alignment with the Soviet Union and the United States greatly influenced its
ability to maintain a professional military.
In this post-revolution transitional period, Egypt’s only chance of securing a true
democracy – one in which a non-corrupt, non-military, representative, and transparent
32

Sayigh, 12.
Ibid, 12.
34
Imad Harb, “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?”, Middle East
Journal 57 (2003): 287.
33
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government is put in place to genuinely serve and protect the interests of the Egyptian
people – is through the disassembling of the officers’ republic. If President Morsi’s
administration fails to do so, then the officers’ republic “will use its extensive political
reach and its control over key bureaucratic and economic enclaves to subvert any future
government of which it disapproves.”35 A complete unraveling of the officers’ republic,
however, requires knowledge of precisely how it was wound up in the first place: what
measures did Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak take individually to establish and enhance the
robustness of the military institution throughout the last sixty years?
This paper finds that Egypt’s past leaders have used different variations of four
main strategies in their respective efforts to control the armed forces: politicization, depoliticization, professionalization, and cooptation.

35

Sayigh, 4.
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IV: Nasser, 1956-1970
Nasser’s Ascendance to Power
On July 23 of 1952, a group of Egyptian army officers called the Free Officers
Movement took power of the Egyptian state through the execution of a bloodless coup
d’etat.36 Led in part by the young officer Gamal Abdel Nasser, the military uprising was
provoked by widespread discontent with Egypt’s lack of independence: under King
Farouk’s monarchical rule, Egypt was nothing more than Britain’s colonial puppet. The
dismantling of the king and the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, and therefore of Egypt’s
connection to its imperial counterpart, would introduce a new chapter in the progression
of Egypt’s political history.
After the establishment of the new republic, Muhammad Naguib became the first
President of Egypt in 1953. His time in office, however, was rather short-lived, as
contention rooted in power politics between Gamal Abdel Nasser and he ultimately led to
his forced removal from office.37 In June of 1956, 99.9% of five million Egyptians voted
in favor of Nasser, the only running candidate, for president under a newly formed
constitution that made Egypt a socialist Arab state with a one-party political system.38
Nasser’s regime, which reigned from 1956 until 1970, directed Egypt down a pathway of
almost complete military political dominance, a legacy that persisted up until the fall of
the Mubarak regime in 2011.

Nasser’s Strategies
36

Robert St. John, “Gamal Abdel Nasser”, Encyclopedia Britannica: Academic Edition,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/404045/Gamal-Abdel-Nasser.
37
Said K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004, 55.
38
St. John.
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In order to control the armed forces, therefore, Nasser’s main strategy involved
extensive military politicization: he intentionally staffed “the cabinet, ministries, and state
machinery with military personnel.”39 This was Nasser’s way of gaining control over a
bureaucracy that had been traditionally independent.40 This policy backfired in 1967,
when Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt. In response, Nasser sought to reverse
his tactic of politicization, and with the help of the Soviet Union, he began to
professionalize the ranks of the military as well.
Nasser transformed Egypt into what Anouar Abdel-Malek refers to as “une
société militaire, ”41a military society, wherein the armed forces became the primary
agents of societal transformation. Under Nasser, the military not only served to protect
the regime, but it also participated significantly in governing alongside the president.
Military officers were given prominent positions in the cabinet, ministries, and state
machinery to an almost overwhelming degree: “of 18 cabinets between 1952 and 1970,
only the first (lasted for less than two months) was headed by a civilian.”42 In addition,
out of 100 top positions in the Foreign Ministry in 1962, 72 of them were occupied by
military officers, “and all ambassadors to Europe except for three were officers.”43 The
three successive political organizations created by the regime (the Liberation rally (LR),
the National Union (NU), and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)) were also largely
controlled by military men.44

39

Kelsey Miller, “Can NATO React to the Arab Spring?” The Henry M. Jackson School of International
Studies (2012): 72.
40
Miller, 72.
41
Sayigh, 10.
42
Harb, 278.
43
Ibid, 279.
44
Ibid, 279.
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Eliezer Beeri describes the Egyptian power structure under Nasser at the time of
his death in 1970 as a three-tiered pyramid. Nasser occupied the pinnacle of the pyramid,
representing his exceptional position as ruler of the state. The second tier of power
included nine individuals who were “vice-presidents, prime ministers, and Speakers of
the People’s Assembly,” and all of whom were either former or active military officers.45
The third tier “consisted of the different deputy premiers between 1962 and 1967, 42 in
all, 13 of whom were from the military.”46 Within all three of these tiers, therefore, 42%
of the ruling elite were officers.47
Nasser’s economic policies further entrenched military dominance in Egyptian
society. In an effort to make Egypt economically independent, Nasser imposed radical
economic strategies that effectively transformed the Egyptian economy from a private
dominated sector economy to a public dominated sector economy. The nationalization of
the Suez Canal, the confiscation and redistribution of land, and the seizure of all privately
owned financial institutions helped to fortify this economic transformation. By 1965, “the
public sector contributed 95% of all investment and controlled 83% of all means of
production.”48 Consequently, the Egyptian bureaucracy “increased by 161% between
1961-1962 and 1970-1971”, and the number of ministries increased from 15 to 28
between 1952 and 1970.49 Military officers, with their close connection to the
revolutionary regime and to the sentiments of the president, were suddenly presented
with a large bureaucracy and many positions to be filled.

45

Ibid, 279.
Ibid, 279.
47
Ibid, 279.
48
Ibid, 278.
49
Ibid, 278.
46
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During the Nasser era, retired military officers also received key posts in the state
that lay completely beyond the sphere of government. In fact, Abdel-Malek estimates
that approximately “1,500 officers had been appointed to the upper ranks of the nonmilitary establishment,” occupying high-profile positions in “culture, the press, radio and
television,” as well as senior administrative positions of the boards of public
corporations, etc.50 Nasser effectively transformed the military into a multi-functional
political body, managing to mold the Egyptian society into one that valued the military as
such. In this way, the president was able to maintain control of his military by ensuring
his officers’ economic wellbeing and political prominence in exchange for their support
and undying loyalty to the regime.
The 1967 Six-Day War
Nasser’s strategy of control, however, proved to be defective when Egypt was
faced with a real external threat from Israel on June 5th of 1967. In a surprise attack,
Israeli jets succeeded in completely demolishing a large portion of Egypt’s air force, and
in the following days the Israeli ground forces were able to defeat the Egyptian army and
seize the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula.51 Imad Harb argues that the defeat was
“precipitated by a combination of factors including command and control problems and
the politicization of the military command.”52 The factionalism, lack of qualification and
military training, and disorganized nature of the military that resulted from its
politicization essentially rendered the military useless in its capacity to function as the
defender and protector of the Egyptian state.

50

Sayigh,10-11.
Harb, 281.
52
Ibid, 281.
51
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The politicization of the armed forces, however, was not the only factor
contributing to its inadequacy in the 1967 Six-Day War. Egypt’s international and
regional standing in the years leading up to the 1967 war significantly influenced its lack
of military readiness. Nasser’s foreign policy throughout the early 1960’s greatly
focused on the plans of a unified Arab state system53, of which he would be the leader.
This vision “created tremendous intra-Arab conflict,” and consequently “left little time
for concerns about Israel” during the period leading up to the June attack of 1967.54
Egypt was not inclined, therefore, to “secure a greater commitment from foreign actors”55
because it was largely preoccupied with regional engagements.
Not surprisingly, Egypt did not seek a great deal of military assistance from the
Soviet Union in the years leading up to 1967, its closest great power ally at the time. As
early as 1955, the Soviet Union served as Egypt’s principal arms supplier; yet the
relationship was tainted by a mutual suspicion of “each other’s motivations and the
potential costs of any close association or level of commitment.”56 In comparison to the
years after the 1967 war, in which increased Israeli security threats and domestic
instability prompted greater reliance on the Soviet Union and on regional actors, the years
before the war demonstrated Egypt’s lack of international support.57 Egypt’s limited
external financial assistance contributed, alongside its politicization, to the military’s
failure in the 1967 Six-Day War.

53

Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of
Egypt, 1962-73,” International Organization 45 (1991): 379.
54
Ibid, 380.
55
Ibid, 379.
56
Ibid, 380.
57
Ibid, 381.
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With increased military support from the Soviet Union, Nasser professionalized
the military ranks by providing improved training, equipment, and instruction. Between
1967 and 1972, for instance, “the number of Soviet troops and advisers stationed in Egypt
increased from” 500 to nearly 15,000.58 In fact, by 1970 the Soviet Union had infiltrated
“all levels of Egyptian defense planning”: it had retrained the Egyptian army, funded
practically all of its weaponry, and provided additional financial support for Egypt’s war
effort.59
In addition to using Soviet aid to professionalize the military, Nasser also sought
to depoliticize the Egyptian armed forces. While both Nasser and Field Marshal ‘Abd alHakim ‘Amr “tended their resignations”60 in the days that followed the 1967 fiasco, it
was ‘Amr’s suicide that changed the way the military as a political entity would be
conceptualized in the future. Harb believes that ‘Amr’s death
Signaled a new approach to the military that centered on
a lessened political role in the regime (although military
presence in the cabinet immediately following the defeat
spiked) and devotion to the duty of regaining the Sinai,
preparedness for a long war, and professionalism.61

On June 11th, Nasser expunged the ranks of the military leadership that were opposed to
him, and filled the new officer corps with a second generation of officers: those who were
not directly affiliated with the 1952 Free Officers Movement. Separated from this
movement, the new generation of officers was thought to be depoliticized in the sense
that it had no connection to the “revolutionary ethos and history”62 that contributed to the
58

Ibid, 385.
Ibid, 386.
60
Sayigh, 281.
61
Ibid, 281.
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Ibid, 281.
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failure of the 1967 Six-Day War with Israel. Despite this transformation, however, the
Free Officers organization was able to maintain its influence within the top elite as
ministers and advisors, and would later serve as a sizeable obstacle to Sadat’s ascension
to power.
Howard J. Dooley, author of “Nasser and DeGaulle: Heroes in Search of a Role”,
makes an interesting and reflective comparison between Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser
and France’s Charles DeGaulle in January of 1971, only a few months after the deaths of
both of these “giants of world politics.”63 Dooley argues that what Nasser and DeGaulle
shared in common was their raw ambition, political brilliance, and ability to alter the
course of history: “both were not merely politicians, but phenomena that often defied
logical analysis.”64 Nasser, the “Afro-Asian nationalist”, managed to take a small and
underdeveloped nation and turn it into a “world force for the first time in more than 2000
years.”65 He proved to his people that Egypt could overcome its social and economic
depravity, and that it was a country worthy of international prestige and respect. He
contributed significantly to the beginning of Egyptian modernization, and effectively
turned the country into the Arab leader of political and military power by the time of his
death in 1970.66
When Nasser’s strategy of military politicization proved defective in the 1967
war, he instituted a two-pronged strategy of professionalization and political
disengagement. Upon Sadat’s ascendance to power in 1970, he continued to implement
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Nasser’s strategy of professionalization and de-politicization, but to a much greater
extent.
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V: Anwar al-Sadat, 1970-1981
Sadat’s Strategies
Anwar al-Sadat, technically the third president of the Egyptian Republic, came
into office after Nasser’s death on September 28, 1970, bringing with him an entirely new
set of ideological and political changes that would serve to significantly alter the role of
the Egyptian military. Much like his predecessor, Sadat used the military as the
foundation upon which he grew his legitimacy and power; yet, the tactics he used to
control the armed forces differed greatly. He was able to completely subordinate the
military under his civilian command through strategies of professionalization and depoliticization. Sadat also used ‘divide and rule’ tactics to enhance military obedience.
Further, his dominance over the military stemmed from his unwillingness to tolerate
dissent of any form or degree throughout the entire state apparatus.
Sadat’s Corrective Revolution
Initially, it was difficult for Sadat to foster a legitimate political base with a strong
support system because unlike Nasser, he did not ascend to power in a revolution.
Instead of starting from scratch, as Nasser had done, Sadat was forced to begin his
presidency within the Nasserist framework, an internal system that had definitively
reached an impasse by the mid-1960s.67 Further, Nasser’s enormous popularity worked
against Sadat in his accession to the presidency: he had “no political base of his own, no
charisma similar to Nasir’s, and [was] hated by his predecessor’s lieutenants for
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inheriting their hero’s legacy.”68 What was Sadat’s solution to this resistance? A
comprehensive purge of all those who were opposed to him and his regime.
This purge, coined the “Corrective Revolution”, occurred in May of 1971. It
eliminated specific Nasserist enemies within the military and the Arab Socialist Union
who Sadat saw as threatening to his position, including the band of Free Officers that
remained in office from Nasser’s government.69 He replaced this inner core of power
with several personal advisors and chief ministers who enjoyed “extremely close personal
relations with Sadat,” forming a sort of “royal family”.70 The Corrective Revolution
would be the first purge of many, as Sadat was not willing to tolerate virtually any degree
of opposition within his regime, despite his talk of ‘democracy’. Instead, he preferred to
build his regime almost purely on trust, appointing “to high office people whom he
trust[ed] … and whose reactions to any given set of circumstances [were] broadly similar
to his own.”71 Otherwise, those who disagreed with Sadat to an extent that he deemed
inappropriate were thoughtlessly dismissed from their positions.72 For instance, Sadat
“jailed Fawzi, arrested Sadiq, exiled Shazli, and retired Gamassi,”73 because he saw these
individuals as directly threatening to his supreme command.
Within historical literature, Sadat is often described as a particularly dynamic,
determined, and dominant leader; but one that was perpetually suspicious of his fellow
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elites.74 It was this wariness that contributed significantly to the ways in which Sadat
consolidated his power, both within his inner circle of elites and within the Egyptian
armed forces. Unlike Nasser, who was constrained by his Free Officer comrades – “men
who made the revolution with him, and who, far from being his creatures, were relatively
permanent members of a team not easily disregarded and who on occasion could defy
him” – Sadat was controlled by no one.75 The elite under Sadat were better described as
“‘his’ men” than as his equals or colleagues, as they were frequently ambiguous persons
appointed to power, to whom Sadat had no obligation.76 In fact, Sadat made it a point to
periodically refresh the ranks of the elite in order to prevent any individual from feeling a
sense of permanency, which would challenge the supremacy of the president. He
maintained few advisors and seldom consulted with them, often making major decisions
single-handedly with little instruction.77 As a result, Sadat emerged as the absolute
pinnacle of power during his reign; no other power centers apart from the president were
able to form – not even the military.
As a result of Sadat’s thorough consolidation of power, he was able to finally and
completely subordinate the Egyptian military to his civilianized presidential leadership.
To be able to control the military, Sadat not only dismissed officers who disagreed with
him, but he also used ‘divide and rule’ tactics to manipulate the officer corps, pitting
individual officers against each other to thwart their attention away from the president.78
Sadat replaced, for instance, the Minister of War General Muhammad Sadiq with the
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apolitical General Ahmad Hasan ‘Ali because Sadiq had objected to Sadat’s war plans
against Israel.79 He managed the military in the same way that he managed his inner core
of elites: through a combination of sidelining, dismissals, and divide and rule strategies.
What resulted was an exceptionally loyal and obedient military.
Professionalization
Sadat also sought to professionalize the armed forces. The 1967 defeat under
Nasser’s command proved to Sadat that the Egyptian military needed to reorient its focus
toward accepting more of a professionalized and depoliticized role within the state. The
most evident example of professionalism during Sadat’s presidency is the amount of
attention paid to improving recruitment, equipment, and training.80 In preparation for the
1973 surprise attack on Israel, therefore, Sadat pressured the Soviet Union – Egypt’s
strongest great power ally at the time – to supply the Egyptian military with the most upto-date arms technology to match that of Israel.81 A greater effort was made to recruit
university graduates to fill the ranks of junior officers and tank commanders, and the
implementation of a more rigid training program reestablished confidence and legitimacy
in the military.82 Although the Egyptians technically lost the 1973 October war in the
sense of pure military combat, the “professionalization of the officer corps has implied
unquestioning acceptance of the commands of legitimate authority – that is, of the
president.”83
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From the Soviet Union to the United States
An important outcome of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was the shift in partnership
from the Soviet Union to the United States. Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy”
during the war, in which he negotiated a deal with Sadat that “eventually culminated in
President Anwar Sadat’s willingness to make peace with Israel,”84 had huge implications
for Egypt’s military. These negotiations led to the Camp David Accords in 1978 between
U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and Anwar Sadat,
setting the stage the following year for the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.85 Both the EgyptIsrael Peace Treaty and the Egypt-U.S. strategic partnership represent alliances resulting
from the 1973 Yom Kippur war that have persisted to this day.
Making peace with Israel, although condemned by many Arab states, was
essentially Sadat’s way of getting closer to the United States.86 What Egypt lost in
financial assistance from his Arab neighbors and the Soviet Union was supplanted by the
enormous benefits received from its new partnership with the U.S. Starting in 1979,
“Egypt has been the second-largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S. bilateral foreign
assistance,”87 and has received approximately $35 billion in military assistance since
then.88 While Egypt values its relationship with the U.S. for basic economic reasons, its
primary incentive to sustain a close relationship has been the “U.S. support for Egypt’s
military, and thus for its governing regime.”89 This relationship significantly enhanced
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the professionalization of the military, as Sadat could use U.S. military funds to provide
exceptional training and up-to-date weaponry.
De-politicization
Depoliticizing the armed forces was yet another strategy that Sadat took to control
the military. Whereas in 1967 the military occupied between 41% to 66% of key
government positions, that figure was reduced significantly to only 22% in 1972.90 Under
Nasser, approximately one-third of the elite was comprised of military officers; in Sadat’s
later years, only one in ten elites had originated from the officer corps.91 Sadat’s political
reorientation essentially made it so that a military career no longer presented a direct
pathway into the political elite.
Sadat’s economic policies also helped to disengage the military from the political
sphere. In an effort to open the Egyptian economy for development, Sadat imposed a
range of liberalization policies as part of his Open Door Economic Policy (ODEP).92
These policies implied decreased spending on the military.93 Despite the smaller defense
budget, as Miller suggests, “the military-industrial complex was growing and becoming
more self-sufficient.” 94
Bread Riots of 1977
A testament to the military’s subordination under Sadat – a product of its
professionalization and de-politicization – was the military’s reaction to the bread riots of
1977. Egypt was one of several Arab states involved in a “Mediterranean debt crescent”
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in the 1970s.95 Often upon the request of the International Monetary Fund, authoritarian
elites throughout the Arab world responded to massive debt by subscribing to the
neoliberal ideology, a Western economic theory that promotes open markets and a
limited economic role for the state.96 This meant, however, significant cuts to subsidies
that were previously provided by the state as a part of what James Gelvin refers to as the
‘ruling bargain’, or the “accommodation reached between the states and the citizens they
govern.”97 Citizens were essentially stripped of their access to certain ordinary
commodities that they depended on, prompting many to take to the streets in protest of
this new economic practice. This is precisely what instigated the bread riots of 1977 in
Egypt. In order to quell the protests throughout the state, Sadat called upon the military to
restore order. The armed forces complied, and obediently returned to their barracks
shortly after the uprising.98
We can compare this instance of mass protest to that of the 2011 revolution.
Like the bread riots of 1977, part of the Egyptian resentment for the Mubarak regime
resulted from a deteriorating economy. In March of 2008, for instance, Egypt
experienced widespread bread shortages, which eliminated affordable access to a staple
food product of the Egyptian diet. Egypt spends roughly US$2.75 billion annually to
subsidize the cost of bread to Egyptians, an example of the social contract – the ruling
bargain – that continues to exist between the state and its people.99 Among other

95

James Gelvin, The Arab Uprising: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), 16.
96
Gelvin, 17.
97
Gelvin, 12.
98
Harb, 283.
99
Miller et al., 88.

29

instances of economic insufficiencies, including price hikes and banking scandals100,
Egypt’s economic conditions leading up to both the 1977 bread riots and the 2011
revolution were a major source of public dissatisfaction with the government.
Shortly after the police force collapsed within the first week of the 2011 uprising,
Mubarak called upon the army to open fire on the demonstrators in order to silence their
protests.101 The armed forces refused the president’s request, a decision that I believe
determined the outcome of the revolution. Whereas Sadat had basically issued the same
order in 1977 that Mubarak had to his military in 2011, Sadat’s military acquiesced
without hesitation, while Mubarak’s military refused. A fundamental difference,
therefore, exists between the armed forces under Sadat and the armed forces under
Mubarak: the independence with which Mubarak’s military behaved during the Egyptian
revolution of 2011 is something that lacked in the era of Sadat. The independence that
Mubarak bestowed upon the military was originally intended as a tactic of control; yet, it
was the military’s autonomy that ultimately led to Mubarak’s demise.
Sadat’s Military
Through the processes of depoliticizing and professionalizing the military, Sadat
was able to exclude military elite from political decision-making, yet simultaneously hold
the military establishment completely under his control. As a result, the military society
that flourished under the rule of Nasser declined, transforming its role from protector of
the revolution against imperialism and Zionism into a functional security apparatus that
guarded the order of the Egyptian state. By the time Sadat was assassinated in 1981i, he
had come close to reconciling what Peter Feaver refers to as the “civil-military
100
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problematique”: the establishment of a military that is “strong enough to do anything the
civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians
authorize them to do.”102 His successor, Hosni Mubarak, would introduce yet again an
entirely new age for the Egyptian military, one that drew components from both Nasser’s
Egypt and Sadat’s to create a new era of civil-military relations.
Sadat, therefore, amplified the policies of professionalism and de-politicization
first introduced by Nasser at the end of his rule. Sadat’s control also stemmed from the
way in which he sought unquestioned power for himself: through policies of dismissals
and divide and rule tactics.
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VI: Hosni Mubarak, 1981-2011
Mubarak’s Strategies
The Egyptian officers’ republic, as coined by Yezid Sayigh, reached its most
entrenched state during the rule of Hosni Mubarak. While Mubarak continued to
implement Sadat’s policies of de-politicization and professionalization, he also sought to
draw the entire officer corps into his own system of crony patronage and privileged
access at the same time through a strategy of cooptation, which gave the military
economic, institutional, and judicial autonomy in the state. Like the militaries of Nasser
and Sadat, what resulted from Mubarak’s policies was an extremely loyal and obedient
military. Unlike the militaries of Nasser and Sadat, however, Mubarak’s military
transformed into one that “became invisible by virtue of its very ubiquity.”103
The officers’ republic existed in nearly every sector of the civilian sphere of
Egyptian society, to the point where its pervasiveness became normal, and thus
accepted.104 Moreover, the military under Mubarak finally solidified into a stable
institution, whose professionalism warranted the president’s policy of “ceding certain
independent functions to it.”105 By granting the Egyptian Armed Forces significant
economic, institutional, and judicial autonomy through the implementation of certain
advantageous policies, Mubarak gained in return a loyal military that, like the militaries
of Nasser and Sadat, served as his base of power and legitimacy.
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Why Cooptation?
Mubarak’s extensive use of cooptation under his crony patronage system was his
main strategy of coercing political loyalty for his regime. The need to augment Sadat’s
strategies of professionalization and de-politicization with cooptation was perhaps a
consequence of conditions relating to the post-Cold War environment. These conditions
include the expansion and increased professionalization of the armed forces due to
Egypt’s military partnership with the United States, as well as the liberalization policies
that ensued in the post-Cold War era.
After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Sadat’s diplomatic negotiations in the Camp
David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty effectively replaced the Soviet Union
with the U.S. as the patron of Egypt. However, while the military under Soviet influence
represented merely an “unwieldy Soviet-based fighting force,” the military under U.S.
influence – and especially during the rule of Mubarak – was transformed into “a
modernized, well-equipped, Western-style military.”106
Without the military aid of the United States during the reign of Mubarak, the
Egyptian military would in no way be as professional as it is today. Under Mubarak’s
regime, the military partnership with the United States grew immensely, even further than
it had under Sadat’s rule. At the time of the revolution in January of 2011, Egypt stood as
the 10th largest military in the world, with more than 468,000 members, and
approximately “625 U.S. military personnel stationed in Egypt.”107 Egypt receives the
majority of its foreign aid funds from the U.S. in the form of “three primary accounts:
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Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International
Military Education and Training (IMET).108 Since 1987, Egypt has received $1.3 billion
annually from the United States in military aid.109 This has had an extraordinary impact
on Egypt’s defense policies and purchasing power: “the $1.3 billion received in fiscal
year 2005 comprised more than 80 percent of Egypt’s total military procurement
budget.”110
The military support from the United States during the Mubarak era was
particularly influential in terms of training and technology. IMET assistance was
significant because it enabled Egyptian military personnel to be trained by American
standards of military education.111 Egypt and the United States started coproducing
M1A1 Abrams Battle tanks in 1988, an enterprise that serves as “one of the cornerstones
of U.S. military assistance to Egypt” today.112 Additionally, the FMF program enabled
the transfer of actual military technology: “specific examples of purchases since 1979
include 220 F-16 aircraft, three dozen Apache helicopters, and 880 M1A1 (Abrams)
tanks.”113 In contrast to Soviet and U.S. military aid during the Sadat era, the U.S.
military assistance during the Mubarak era was much more significant, in both monetary
and technical terms.
Further, Mubarak implemented enhanced liberalization policies which enabled
political parties to become “freer to operate publicly” in the post-Cold War era.114 Even
“those adhering to a mild form of Islamic radicalism” were permitted to engage in
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politics to a certain extent.115 This meant that Mubarak’s regime was surrounded by
various organizations of opposition, which directly threatened his position as the supreme
leader of Egypt. In order to negate the prevalence of opposition within society, I believe
that Mubarak used the strategy of military cooptation in order to broaden his basis of
support. According to Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, the reason why autocrats
survive for decades is directly related to their “overwhelming monopoly of force.”116
When they are faced with opposition either from within the ruling elite or from outsiders
within society, these rulers tend to rely on the support of certain institutions to maintain
their position.117 Mubarak needed the military institution to protect his regime because it
acted as a deterrent to dissenting political parties.
In part, this could explain why Mubarak sought to strengthen his military in the
post-Cold War era through the U.S.-Egyptian military partnership previously discussed.
While this military buildup was certainly a preemptive measure intended to defend Egypt
against any threat to its national security, it is possible that it was also a product of
Mubarak’s paranoia. The cooptation of a robust military institution was Mubarak’s
means of prolonging his presidential tenure. As part of the bargain involved in
cooptation, Mubarak granted the military significant economic, institutional, and judicial
autonomy in exchange for political obedience and loyalty to his regime. Mubarak’s need
for cooptation, therefore, explains why his military functioned much more independently
than Sadat’s military. The following section will address the cooptation policies
Mubarak implemented that helped to render the military autonomous.
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Mubarak’s Policies of Cooptation
In order to coopt the armed forces, Mubarak invented what was called “a loyalty
allowance”. Senior officers were promised this loyalty allowance upon retirement, which
normally granted them guaranteed careers in the state sector, implying a second income
alongside military pensions.118 The most well-connected officers often received more
preferable settlements as retirees, including leadings positions in government ministries
as well as “in civilian bureaucracy that offer[ed] particularly lucrative opportunities for
extra income generation or asset accumulation.”119 In exchange for Mubarak’s loyalty
allowance, officers were to refrain from political involvement and had no choice but to
accept poor wages during their military careers.120 In this way, the loyalty allowance
policy incentivized compliance with the system during the years that these officers were
forced to basically “wait their turn.”121
Not only did the crony patronage system guarantee certain privileges, as in the
case of the loyalty allowance, it also determined military promotion. Junior officers that
were perceived to be disloyal or political by their superiors were incapable of moving
beyond the rank of major.122 In fact, the only officers that were promoted to middle rank
positions – positions above the rank of major - were those who had been cleared for
advancement based on their commitment and loyalty to the Mubarak regime.123 It was
political loyalty – not military merit – that ensured an officer’s well-being within the
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system.124 As his crony patronage system became the backdrop of civil-military relations,
therefore, Mubarak’s reliance on cooptation to maintain control over the armed forces
was unparalleled by either regime that preceded his.
Secondly, Mubarak sought to coopt the armed forces by providing them access to
a large portion of the Egyptian economy. As a result, the military became a major
producer and exporter of military equipment, household appliances, agriculture, and
infrastructure,125 and held such private enterprises as tourist hotels and travel
companies.126 In 1979, Law 32 gave the military “financial and institutional
independence from the government’s budget and allowed it to open special accounts in
commercial banks.”127 In this way, the military could truly function as an independent
economic institution, providing the officer corps with attractive benefits such as
improved medical care, higher personal income, and access to scarce resources.128 In
addition, Mubarak’s shift toward the privatization of the public sector in 1991 required
the implementation of neoliberal policies that opened the door to increased officer
involvement in the economy.129 The military’s economic independence enabled the
officer corps to reap important financial benefits that, in turn, solidified their commitment
to Mubarak’s regime.
Finally, Mubarak ensured the institutional stability and independence of the
military through legislative and judicial means. Not only did the military control its
military-owned businesses and U.S. military aid, it also enjoyed “exclusive control over
124
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the defense budget.”130 This last point – the control over the defense budget – requires
particular attention, for it has important implications in the discussion of civil-military
relations. The fact that the defense budget rested entirely in the hands of the military
implies that civilian oversight was nonexistent in that particular area of defense policy
under the Mubarak regime. Within much of the literature pertaining to democratic civilmilitary relations, civilian legislative oversight of the various components of defense
policy and the armed forces is necessary in order to hold the military accountable, and
thus under control.131 The fact that the military, and not the civilian authority, maintained
control over the budget speaks to the degree to which the military institution was
permitted to operate independently within the state.
Counter to standard civil-military theory, however, the lack of adequate civilian
oversight in this case did not pose a serious threat to Mubarak’s ability to maintain power
– at least, not until the fall of his regime in 2011. In fact, enabling the military to exert
itself so freely and independently throughout the state was exactly how Mubarak
succeeded in coopting them: he protected the interests of the military in exchange for its
undying loyalty to the regime. After all, Mubarak was a former military man himself;
ensuring the supremacy of the military institution was in his best interest too.
The military’s institutional stability also stems from the structure of Egypt’s
judicial system, which, according to Sullivan and Jones, is a broken system.132 The
Administrative Monitoring Authority, as mentioned previously, is a judicial oversight
body established to fight corruption throughout the state by investigating administrative
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and financial crimes.133 The military is the only actor that is exempt from its jurisdiction,
as the armed forces do not incur any civilian oversight other than that of the president.134
This is a deliberate policy designed not only to grant the president exceptional judicial
power, but also to serve as one of many gateways for the military to infiltrate the civilian
bureaucracy.135
Additionally, the existence of military courts within the complex Egyptian legal
and judicial system further accentuated the institutional autonomy of the military under
the Mubarak regime. The military courts claim jurisdiction only over military cases.
Under the emergency law, however, the president has the power to refer any case to the
military courts, including cases involving civilians.136 Mubarak, despite repeated
promises to lift it, kept in place the emergency law since 1981, “which [gave] the state
broad power to detain suspects without charge for lengthy periods, try civilians in
military courts, prevent public gatherings, and monitor private communications.”137 This
is clearly a very controversial and deeply illiberal system that favors the executive power
and the armed forces.
Since the fall of Mubarak, the SCAF has abused its judicial powers enormously,
most likely in attempts to demonstrate and maintain its favorable position in Egyptian
society. In early May of 2011, the military court in Cairo sentenced a 17-year-old civilian
boy to death, despite the fact that the death penalty is illegal for minors under standard
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Egyptian law.138 This is part of a trend that has been going on since late January, “when
the Army took on an expanded role in securing and governing Egypt.”139 The
extrajudicial powers of the military, enabled by the Mubarak regime, directly threaten
Morsi’s current leadership and the likelihood that he will be able to effectively control the
activities of the military in the future – a necessary stipulation of legitimate democracy.
Enabling the economic, institutional, and judicial independence of the military
under his crony patronage system in exchange for an unfaltering loyalty to his regime is
the process through which Hosni Mubarak controlled his armed forces. A particularly
dangerous consequence of the military society that Mubarak created was the change in
the Egyptian concept of social order. Under Mubarak, the pervasiveness of the military
throughout the entirety of the state generated an elevated social status that separated the
military from the civilians. The military was not only the national protector, it was also
the charitable peace-keeper, the law-maker, and the decision-maker. In other words,
civilians became the dependents of the paternalistic military under Mubarak’s rule.140
This was not the case in Nasser’s era.141 Only a few days before his regime fell, for
instance, Mubarak addressed the Egyptian public as ‘his children’, standing proof of the
fact that Mubarak and his military considered themselves to be more competent than their
civilian counterparts142, and therefore more deserving of higher status. This legacy,
entrenched within Egyptian culture for the past 30 years, is not going to be easy to break.

138

Kristen Chick, “Egypt shifts to military justice for civilians in post-Mubarak era,” The Christian Science
Monitor, 18 May 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0518/Egypt-shifts-to-militaryjustice-for-civilians-in-post-Mubarak-era.
139
Ibid.
140
Sayigh, 22.
141
Ibid, 22.
142
Ibid, 22.

40

If Morsi is to attempt to subordinate the military under civilian leadership, however, the
paternalistic culture must be eradicated altogether.
The Fall of Mubarak
If Mubarak’s strategies of cooptation, professionalization, and de-politicization
effectively established this tight crony-based system, then why did he fall from power in
2011basically at the hands of the military?
Crony-based authoritarian regimes are inherently unstable. In my opinion, the
process of gaining political loyalty through the distribution of certain privileges can only
function for so long. The issue is that this kind of loyalty is not necessarily rooted in an
individual’s fundamental beliefs, which provide purpose beyond the materialistic
privileges offered by crony patronage. In other words, a military officer will remain loyal
to a regime under a crony-based system for as long as its promises satisfy his immediate
material needs. Consequently, these regimes and their co-opted military counterparts do
not always share fundamental ideologies and morals, because their relationship never
required this kind of deep-rooted convergence.
In its decision to refuse the orders of Mubarak to fire upon civilians during the
2011 Egyptian Revolution, the Egyptian military verified the instability of its former
leader’s crony patronage system. The military’s decision to side with the Egyptian
citizenry outweighed the decision to abide by Mubarak’s request because the material
privileges provided by the system were comparatively insignificant to the prospects of a
democratic movement.
The military’s autonomy, which was a principle outcome of Mubarak’s strategy
of cooptation, also contributed to the leader’s fall. If the military had not been as
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economically, institutionally, and judicially autonomous as it was under Mubarak’s rule, I
would argue that it would have had a harder time making the definitive decision to refuse
Mubarak’s orders. As we saw throughout the nearly year and a half rule of the SCAF
following Mubarak’s exit, the military’s independence as a self-sufficient societal
institution proved that it had the capacity to function without the ruler.
Its decision to side with the Egyptian people also demonstrated that the military
was deeply politicized, despite Mubarak’s shallow strategy of de-politicization.
Although Mubarak’s military did “not hold political positions as it did during its heyday
under Nasir,” “the military cannot be seen as fully disengaged from politics.”143 From
Naguib to Mubarak, all of Egypt’s presidents since 1952 have originated from the
military. Consequently, the military has never fully disengaged from politics in the sense
that Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak ensured the military’s institutional dominance and
protected the military’s interests. The autonomy and politicization of the military,
therefore, significantly contributed to the fall of the Mubarak regime.
Finally, it is possible that the United States indirectly played a role in the fall of
the Mubarak regime due to the strong military partnership between the two states. In
fact, Robert Hunter of CNN argues that “one reason Egypt’s military responded to the
demonstrations so positively has been its long-standing ties to the U.S. military,
stretching back three decades.”144 During the initials days of the uprising, the Egyptian
chief of staff and a group of high-ranking officers engaged in talks with “American
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hosts” in the Pentagon.145 These talks addressed the issue of military action in the
Egyptian uprising, and encouraged the military to exercise restraint.146 The Egyptian
military’s compliance with American requests suggests the degree of influence that the
United States has in directing the revolution.
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VII: Mohamed Morsi, 2012 - Present
By January 25th of 2011, which marked the start of the revolution, the Egyptian
military had transformed into a force to be reckoned with, a result of six decades under
the rule of four successive military leaders. Right now, Egypt is suspended in a
transitional state as the newly elected civilian president, Mohamed Morsi, struggles to
solidify his position as the leader of the people’s revolution, while simultaneously deal
with the exceptional power and prestige of the military.
Will the officers’ republic remain above the law? Or will Morsi be able to bring
the military under civilian control? Is this a zero-sum game? While the answers to these
questions are not yet clear given the current state of the ongoing transition, a closer look
at the changes that Morsi has implemented since he assumed office on June 30, 2012 will
provide an indication of the direction that he has taken in regard to Egypt’s civil-military
relations.
On June 17, just days before Morsi was declared president under Egypt’s first
democratic election, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued a constitutional
declaration intended to hinder the powers of the president if, in fact, Morsi were to be the
victor. The addendum effectively dissolved parliament on the grounds that one-third of
its members had been illegally elected.147 The real issue for the SCAF, though, was the
fact that the parliament was Islamist-dominated, which posed a threat to the military’s
ability to maintain its legislative powers. By dissolving parliament, therefore, the military
assumed all legislative powers, which “stripped Morsi of much of his presidential
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authority.”148 The constitutional declaration also positioned the military beyond civilian
control, and gave the SCAF permission to “appoint a new assembly if the current one is
unable to complete the job” of drafting a new constitution.149
In defiance of the military’s decree, Morsi recalled the formerly dissolved
parliament on July 8th.150 It was a surprise decision, and some have even reported that the
military had not been consulted before the ruling was made official.151 By reinstating
parliament, Morsi abstracted legislative authority from the hands of the military and
returned it back to parliament. In addition, he declared that within 60 days of the official
formulation of a new constitution, parliamentary elections will be held.152 In this way,
Morsi could strike somewhat of a compromise as to appease the parties involved in the
construction of a new Egypt: in the short term, at least, “the military gets part of what it
wanted – a new parliament in coming months – and Islamists can avoid a situation where
the military dominates a legislative authority.”153 More importantly, this move
demonstrates Morsi’s desire to limit the supra-powers of the military through
reconciliatory – as opposed to aggressive – measures.
On August 12, President Morsi issued another set of surprising alterations. He
forced the retirement of two of the military’s top chiefs: Field Marshal and Defense
Minister Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and his deputy, Chief of Staff Sami Anan.154 He
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appointed as his vice president top judge Mahmud Makki, and he “issued an addendum to
Egypt’s governing March 2011 interim constitution.”155 The addendum annulled the
SCAF’s June constitutional declaration which “placed the military beyond civilian
control, gave the SCAF a legislative role,” and allowed the military to have control of the
process of writing a new constitution.156 In other words, Morsi has already attempted to
subordinate the military through a strategy of civilian control: he has taken away certain
key legislative powers from the military, and put them into the hands of the civilian
authority. However, while it appears that Morsi’s bold initiatives have turned the tables,
so to speak, one question still lingers: is this enough?
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VIII: Recent Developments
Despite Morsi’s strategy of civilian control, the legacies of Mubarak’s strategies
persist. Incontestably, the dramatic steps that Morsi has taken have spurred the symbolic
shift in authority from the military to the presidency. Whether or not this shift will
actually occur is another question altogether. I see the biggest impediment to the
successful transfer of power from the military to the presidency as being the persistence
of a distinct Egyptian military culture that accepts the military as a superior institution.
Throughout the past sixty years of military dominance, this militaristic culture has fully
developed and ingrained itself into Egyptian society. Under Nasser, the military began its
ascendance to prominence, as it enjoyed extensive political influence. Sadat, although he
depoliticized the institution, perpetuated military dominance by transforming it into a
professionalized force. It was under Sadat that the military gained substantial popular
support, as it proved its valor to the Egyptian people through its military conquests,
namely the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Mubarak’s patronage system provided the military
extraordinary benefits, which, in turn, worked to further elevate its status within society.
At the start of the 2011 revolution, Egypt’s military was truly, as Yezid Sayigh says,
above the state.157
This is a culture accepted both by the soldiers themselves, and by the Egyptian
people. On the one hand, the military sees itself as one of the most important – if not the
most important – institutions in Egypt, due almost entirely to its historical legacy as such.
On the other hand, citizens have come to conceptualize the military as the national
unifier, the almighty protector, and the leader of the people’s revolution. In other words,
157
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this militaristic culture runs deep into Egyptian society. What Morsi has attempted to do
thus far in his quest to subordinate the military falls short of addressing the dangers
associated with this culture, because his initiatives have barely brushed the surface of the
issue. He has implemented only institutional changes (i.e., recalling parliament,
dismissing top military leaders, etc.) intended to transfer tangible powers into his civilian
hands, and thus professionalize the military under his command. In the short run, this
gives the illusion of progressive change towards a democratic society. In the long run,
however, who will claim ownership of the intangible powers currently enabling the
persistence of Egypt’s military society?
The problem is that we, as observers, are often quick to assume that a professional
military is one that will remain neutral and subordinate to civilian leadership, as first
proposed by Samuel Huntington.158 The Egyptian case disproves this theory: the military
was considered to be highly professional under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, for instance.
However, its professionalism did not necessarily imply its neutrality; the Egyptian
military functioned as more of an interest group than as a neutral body. In fact, one could
argue that its professionalism led to its autonomy, which is what ultimately led to not
only its capacity, but also its desire to influence politics. After all, it was the military’s
refusal to fire upon protestors that entirely changed the course of the revolution. If the
military had complied with Mubarak’s order, it is likely that the dictator would still be in
power today. This is not to discredit the incredible efforts of the leagues of Egyptian
civilians that risked their lives in the beginning of 2011 to see an end to Mubarak’s rule.

158

Huntington, 83.

48

Without them, nothing would have changed in Egypt. I firmly believe, however, that the
tipping point of the revolution occurred as a direct result of the military’s noncompliance.
To a certain extent, the Egyptian case fits Samuel Fitch’s theory of political
professionalism. The idea that professionalism prevents militaries from politically
intervening, he says, is a representation of Western ethnocentric thought.159 His studies of
Latin American civil-military relations have actually proved just the opposite – that
“higher levels of military professionalization have in fact generally resulted in more
institutionalized forms of military intervention in politics and rejection of civilian
control.”160 Fitch further dissects his theory, proposing two outcomes of political
professionalism: tutelary regimes or conditional democracies.161 It is the latter of the two
outcomes, conditional democracies, that applies most directly to the Egyptian case. In a
conditional democracy, the military “remains in the background politically, yet it
indirectly influences policy and remains prepared to intervene if it judges that national
security is threatened by the actions of the civilian regime.”162 We saw the Egyptian
military do just this: it remained in the background until the conditions of the revolution
prompted it to intervene on the side of the populace.
Further, the SCAF’s erratic behavior throughout the transition period has
demonstrated its desire to maintain this conditional democracy. After the fall of Mubarak
and the subsequent power transfer to the SCAF, its “zigzag approach to politics” has
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made the process of deciphering its interests very challenging.163 It has, for instance,
“oscillated from an apparently heartfelt desire to transfer power in a timely manner … to
taking steps extending the process seemingly in order to safeguard its interests.”164 The
inconsistency is due in part to a conflict of interest, in which the military wants to
maintain all of its privileges – “such as a secret budget sheltered from civilian oversight;
de facto immunity from prosecution;” and its control over large portions of the economy
– but at the same time has no intention of actually governing.165 In other words, the
SCAF wants all the power but does not want to be blamed for the social and economy
instability that will likely ensue as the result of this transition. What I propose is that this
conditional democracy will persist and continue to undermine the legitimacy of Morsi’s
leadership unless he attempts to unravel the officers’ republic.
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IX: Conclusion
Since the election in June of 2012, President Mohamed Morsi’s strategies of
controlling the Egyptian military have fallen short of confronting the powerful military
legacy that persists as a result of sixty years of military dominance throughout Egyptian
culture and society. While his initiatives have been symbolically bold, his tactics of
civilian control have only established institutional changes that limit the legal functions
of the military in the matters of legislative and executive authority. These measures are
no match against the militaristic culture that characterizes Egyptian society– a culture that
is valued by both the armed forces and the populace.
Both Nasser and Sadat implemented policies that contributed greatly to the
persistence of military dominance. Nasser initially politicized the armed forces, giving
them significant access to political participation and decision-making. Sadat’s strategies
of de-politicization and professionalization transformed the military into an effective
fighting force. As a result, the military became a widely popular and highly respected
institution of the state.
Mubarak’s strategies of control, however, were the most significant of the three.
The officers’ republic reached its most pervasive state under Mubarak’s rule, as he
complemented Sadat’s former strategies of de-politicization and professionalization with
cooptation. The privileges that the military gained from this plan of mutual
accommodation granted it access to nearly all sectors of Egyptian society, which
effectively turned it into an autonomous institution.
I argue that the most dangerous consequence of Mubarak’s military society was
the transformation of the Egyptian concept of social order. As a result of its
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pervasiveness, the military gained a higher social status than it ever had before, which
reinforced the notion of militaristic paternalism within Egyptian culture.
Looking forward, what lies ahead in the Egyptian transition is the development of
a new constitution. I predict that the writing of a new constitution will have huge
consequences for the balance of power in the state. At this time, the legacy of Mubarak’s
strategies provides the military with the necessary power, autonomy, and legitimacy to
react in any way that it chooses. If the constitution caters too heavily to the Muslim
Brotherhood, for instance, it is possible that the military could stage a coup in opposition.
If Morsi goes too far in the coming months in attempting to further rein in military
authority, that too could cause a dramatic reaction from the armed forces.
The military wants to maintain the prerogatives and privileges it enjoyed
throughout its past. If the constitution significantly limits those privileges, I believe that
we can expect a strong military reaction to follow. However, if Morsi does not want to
emerge from the writing of this constitution as the civilian puppet of the military, he must
make some significant changes that will instigate the process of unraveling the officers’
republic. In this way, it is clear that Morsi is straddling a very fine line.
The Egyptian military, as it has become the most powerful institution of the state
over the past sixty years, is an essential component of this transition. While the future of
Egypt and the prospect of a transition to genuine democracy is momentarily unclear, it is
certain that the military will undoubtedly influence its direction.
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